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Previous studies have demonstrated the role that income tax incentives to landlords play 
in the determination of market rental rates. Landlords typically receive benefits from accelerated 
depreciation on real assets that are usually appreciating. The value of this tax benefit depends 
both on the depreciation schedule as well as the landlord's marginal tax rate. Changes in income 
tax law in the 1980's dramatically affected both of these factors. In 1980, the top federal 
marginal tax rate was 70%, and rental housing could be depreciated on a double-declining 
balance over 20 years. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1980 reduced the top marginal tax 
rate significantly. Changes were made in 1984 that altered the depreciation schedule so that 
rental property could be depreciated more rapidly. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reformed the 
depreciation schedule so that rental property had to be depreciated over 27 years: a significant 
change for landlords. In addition, the top federal marginal tax rate was reduced to 33 percent. 
 
The main direction of the changes in the federal tax code in the 1980's was to decrease 
the tax advantages associated with rental property. Decreases in the top marginal tax rate 
reduced the value of tax write-offs, while increases in the length of time required for 
depreciation reduced the amount of depreciation taken each year. This paper examines the 
impact that these changes had on the rental housing market by looking at the changes in the 
relative cost of renting over the years 1986-1990. The Model 
 
This paper employs a simplified version of the tax arbitrage model developed in Narwold 
(1992). The after-tax cash flow to a landlord for a unit of rental housing may be represented by 
the equation 1: 
 (1  -  τ)(r - tP) + τδP     (1) 
 
where τ is the landlord's marginal tax rate, r is the market rental rate, t is the property tax rate, δ 
is the value of the depreciation allowance, and P is the price per unit of housing.  The 
opportunity cost of investing in a unit of housing is just equal to the after-tax risk-adjusted 
interest rate, as illustrated in equation 2: 
 
  (I  -τ) i P     (2) 
 
where i is the relevant interest rate. The net profits accruing to a landlord would then be equal to 
the difference between equations 1 and 2 or 
 
  (1  -  τ)(r - tP) + τδP - (1 - τ) i P     (3) 
 
The benefits of owning rental property are greatest to those with the highest marginal tax 
rates. Through competition in the market for rental property, the rental rate is reduced until the 
landlords with the highest marginal tax rate are just making a normal rate of return, or zero 
economic profit. This result suggests that equation 3 is equal to zero for landlords in the top tax bracket. Setting equation 3 equal to zero and solving for the market rental rate results in the 
following 
 
  r = tP + iP - (τ/(1 - τ)) δP   (4) 
or  r/P = t + i - (τ/(1 - τ)) δ    (5) 
 
The relative cost of renting, as expressed by the ratio of the market rental rate per unit of 
housing to the price per unit of rental housing, is a function of the marginal tax rate of the 
landlord, the property tax rate, the interest rate, and the depreciation rate. Increases in either the 
property tax rate or the interest rate get passed on to the renters in the form of higher relative 
rent. Similarly, either a decrease in the landlords' marginal income tax rate or a decrease in the 
appreciation allowance results in an increase in the relative cost of renting. Equation 5 provides 
the basis for the examination of the response of the relative cost of renting over the years 
1987-1991. The dramatic changes in the depreciation schedule in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
coupled with the decreases in the top marginal tax rate, should have lead to a significantly higher 
relative cost of renting over the subsequent years. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
The model developed above suggests the type of data and methodology required for this 
study. In order to capture the effect that a decrease in the depreciation allowance has had over 
time on the relative rental rate, both the cost of housing and the market rental rate need to be 
identified for individual housing markets. The American Housing Survey, conducted by the 
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, identifies such information.  
The American Housing Survey (AHS) provides information on housing units in 11 
selected Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) each year. A total of 44 MSAs are included in 
the survey, so that any particular MSA is surveyed once every four years. The AHS is somewhat 
unique in that it identifies particular housing units within an MSA, and tracks them over time. 
This study utilizes the American Housing Surveys from 1987 and 1991. For the purposes of this 
study, the eleven cities chosen were Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Columbus (Ohio), Hartford, 
Houston, New York City/Nassau and Suffolk Counties, Northern New Jersey, San Diego, 
Seattle, and St. Louis. 
 
For each housing unit within these cities, the ownership status was determined. Any 
housing units that changed status from a rental unit to an owner-occupied unit, or vice versa, was 
eliminated from the sample. It is also necessary to try to separate the changes in housing values 
due to renovation from changes in value due to general housing market appreciation. For this 
reason, housing units having a change in square footage between 1987 and 1991 were removed 
from the sample. Finally, those housing units that contained renters who indicated that they were 
either paying no rent, or a non-cash rent, were removed, as these values do not represent 
"market" rent. 
 Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the 11 SMA's 








1987 Value  1991 Value 
Atlanta  585 386 429 928  $88,678  93,007 
Baltimore  704 342 415  1061  84,419  104,491 
Chicago  756 373 466  1067  86,844  108,529 
Columbus  766 290 353  1020  70,750  81,285 
Hartford  798 388 507 958  132,072  141,546 
Houston  622 308 371 696  65,692  68,616 
New  York  1084  413 526 706  135,307  141,383 
Northern 
New Jersey 
840 440 544 888  139,644  136,992 
San  Diego  840 507 584 678  106,202  146,464 
Seattle  771 360 458 868  84,392  125,092 
St.  Louis  667 289 335  1090  69,353  75,392 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the eleven SMA's. Not surprisingly, 
Columbus, Ohio, St. Louis, and Houston were the most affordable housing markets among these 
cities during this period. San Diego was least affordable market, followed closely by New York, 
Northern New Jersey, and Hartford, Connecticut. 
 
  The methodology for determining the increases in market value and rental rate consists of 
simply calculating the difference in the natural logs of rental rates and home values for each 
housing unit over this four-year period: for rental units the change in rental rate is simply computed as the log(rental rate 1991) - log(rental rate 1987).  For owner-occupied units the 
change is similarly computed: value = log(value 1991) - log(value 1987). 
  These numbers were then averaged over all rental units (and owner-occupied units) 
within the SMA to determine the cities' rental rate and housing value appreciation rates. A 
simple hypothesis test may be employed to determine whether the mean increases in these rates 
are equal. The tax arbitrage model of the housing market suggests that over this period, the tax 
changes should have caused a significantly higher increase in rental rates than housing values 
due to lost tax advantages to landlords. Table 2 presents the mean increases in rental rates and 
housing values, as well as the results of this simple hypothesis test. 
At first glance, the results may appear to be somewhat mixed. There was a positive and 
significant difference between the growth rate in rental rates and housing values in 7 of the 11 
SMA's. On closer examination, the lack of a positive results in the remaining four SMA's may be 
explained by virtue of the short-term fluctuations in the housing market in those cities. In the two 
cities where there was no significant difference in the growth rates (Baltimore and Chicago), the 
housing market was very hot, with housing prices rising by over twenty percent over the years 
1987-1991. In the two cities (San Diego and Seattle) where the growth rate in housing prices was 
significantly higher than increases in rental rates, the housing market was very strong, with 
housing prices increasing by over 30% during this four year period. These results tend to support 
the thesis that housing prices may be quicker to adjust to short-term demand fluctuations than 
rental rates. Rental rates typically require either tenant turn over or the passage of a fair amount 













Atlanta %13.0  %5.8  %7.2  2.57  2.79 
Baltimore 22.5  23.2  -0.7  2.24  -0.32 
Chicago  23.5  20.5 3.0 2.51  1.19 
Columbus  27.3 13.8 13.5 3.35 4.03 
Hartford  31.6 10.2 21.4 2.50 8.57 
Houston  18.5 0.5 18.0  3.31  5.40 
New  York  23.5 8.7 14.8  2.88  5.16 
Northern 
New Jersey 
24.9 0.1 24.8  3.08  8.03 
San  Diego  16.4 31.5 -15.1 1.71 -8.83 
Seattle  25.8 37.1 11.3 2.14 -5.28 




The tax arbitrage theory of homeownership suggests that the tax benefits that accrue to 
landlords are passed on to renters due to competition in the rental market. The changes in the 
Federal Tax laws starting in 1980 and continuing through 1986 had significant implications for 
the tax treatment of housing. Decreases in the top marginal tax rate and the lengthening of the 
depreciation schedules made rental housing a much less attractive investment and should have 
caused an increase in market rental rates. This paper examines the changes in market rental rates and housing values over the period 1987-1991 in eleven major SMA's throughout the United 
States. 
 
The evidence is presented that suggests that in seven cities, the rental rate increased over 
this period by an average of 23% as opposed to an increase in housing prices of only 6.4%. In 
two cities, rental rates and housing prices both increased by a little over twenty percent, with no 
statistically significant difference. Finally, in two cities with extremely "hot" housing market, 
housing prices increased by over thirty percent, with rental rates trailing at around twenty 
percent. These results may be attributed to inherent lags in the ability of market rental rates to 
adjust to fluctuations in the demand for housing. The results presented suggest that the tax 
changes instituted during the 1980's, although directed at reducing the tax benefits accruing to 
high income bracket landlords, had the effect of increasing the burden of rental payments made 
by typically lower income renters. References 
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